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1 Introduction
1.1 Charitable Giving and Coordination Game
Why should economists study charity? We present two answers to this ques-
tion. One is the considerable impact of charitable behavior on our economy.
Giving USA foundation (2006) estimates that in the United States, the total
charitable donation for 2005 was $260.28 billion, and $199.07 billion (76.5%
of the total) was contritubions from individuals. The size of these dona-
tions can constitute a topic of research. The National Center for Charitable
Statistics (2006) reports that the total reported charitable deductions came
to $181.01 billion in 2005. It suggests that charitable giving also has an
impact on the society via the tax deduction. The second answer is that
charity is one of areas for which economists still do not possess a suitable
theory. Andreoni (2006b) states \philanthropy is one of the greatest puzzles
for economics." Mainstream economics has assumed that people are ex-
tremely sel¯sh and are only interested in their self-bene¯cial consumptions.
Economists have constructed models on the basis of this assumption. How-
ever, the assumption of sel¯shness is incompatible with charitable behavior.
Even today, the ¯eld of philanthropy remains a puzzle and requires focused
scholarly attention.
In recent years, it has been revealed that when considering charitable be-
havior, especially in large economies, the warm-glow property of preference
is important. Preference with warm-glow property is typically represented
by a utility function that possesses three dimensional domains: the private
consumption, the total amount of donation from all contributors to a charity,
and her own contribution to a charity; whereas classical preference based on
public goods provision model possesses only two dimensional domains, the
private consumption, and the total amount of donation from all contributors
to a charity. Warm-glow is the property that increases a donor's utility as
a result of her own contribution itself.1 This property has been developed
theoretically by Andreoni (1988, 1989, 1990), and supported empirically by
studies such as Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996, 1997) and Ribar and Wilhelm
(2002).2 In particular, Andreoni (1988) and Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) indi-
cate that in a large economy, the warm-glow property is crucial with regard
to enacting adequate proportions of charitable contributions.
The simple simultaneous game of a capital campaign of charity as fol-
lows con¯rms their ¯nding. Capital campaign constitutes a form of fund
drives for charity that incurs a large ¯xed cost to ensure project success.3
Campaigns to collect funds to built a hospital is a case in point. If the
¯xed cost for project success is huge and there are a large number of poten-
1Warm-glow is also called impure-altruism or joy-of-giving.
2Andreoni (2006b) contains a summary and discussions on the warm-glow property.
3We owe this de¯nition of capital campaign to Andreoni (1998).
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tial contributors, each contribution from each donor has almost no e®ect on
the project success. Assume a potential donor in a large economy has two
choices Donate and Not Donate, and possesses a simple classical preference
that depends on her private consumption and whether the project is success
or failure. The latter conditions is equivalent to whether the total amount
of donation exceeds the ¯xed cost or not. Assume that even in the project
failure, the donation is not refunded. Also assume that if a su±ciently large
number of potential donors choose Donate, the project succeeds. Then her
payo® is represented by
Success Failure
Donate Happy Unhappy
Not Donate Very Happy Neutral
Since a potential donor cares only for her private consumption and the
project success and has no e®ect for the project success, she is better o®
choosing Not Donate if the project succeeds. Of course, Not Donate also
yields greater happiness in the project failure. From this table, Not Donate
is the strictly dominant strategy and each potential donor chooses this ac-
tion. It is a prisoner's dilemma game and represents the classical free riding
problem.
On the other hand, if people possess warm-glow property in their pref-
erences, what is the payo® table in the same capital campaign game of a
large economy? It is natural to consider that the payo® table is given by
Success Failure
Donate Very Happy Unhappy
Not Donate Happy Neutral
Contribution renders a donor with warm-glow property happier than not
contributing if the project is success.4 Then it has two pure strategy Nash
equilibria. Either everybody chooses Donate, or everybody chooses Not
Donate. This is a typical coordination game.
Coordination game is one of the most classical problems in game the-
ory, and has signi¯cantly improved in recent years due to Carlsson and
van Damme (1993). They consider a simultaneous incomplete information
coordination game where each agent has little knowledge about the type
distribution, and show the existence of a unique equilibrium with a little
assumptions on the strategies of agents. Even in the standard Bayesian
coordination game where type distribution is common knowledge, a unique
equilibrium is di±cult to obtain. Consequently, their study has drawn at-
tentions. Their game model known as the global game becomes popular
4Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) ¯nd that in a large economy, the warm-glow property has
much stronger e®ect than the altruistic property that is concerned with only the project
success or failure in this example. Following their ¯nding, the payo® to choose Not Donate
at the project success is even represented by Neutral.
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among game theorists and is extended in di®erent aspects. Owing to Morris
and Shin (1998, 2003), it is extended to encompass a coordination problem
in a large economy.5
If there is a su±ciently large number of potential donors with the warm-
glow property of preference, donation behavior for a charity project becomes
a coordination game. In a situation of simultaneous donations, incomplete-
ness of information on the valuation of each potential donor for the charity
project is also appropriate. These are the reasons why we consider that
global game is suitable to model charitable behavior. We construct a simul-
taneous incomplete information game model of charitable giving based on
a simple global coordination game, and characterize a unique equilibrium
of the game. By means of the comparative static analysis, we show that
the model is compatible with the empirical studies of charitable behavior,
especially the ¯eld experimental study of List and Lucking-Reiley (2002).
We discuss this in the next subsection.
1.2 Seed Money
Seed money is a preliminary fund for charity that is publicly announced at
the same time the project itself is announced. It is sometimes provided by
leaders who are directly solicited to donate before the public announcement.
It is well known among charity fund-raisers that if seed money is granted, the
donation from general contributors increases even before Andreoni (1998)
introduces this problem to public economists.
The ¯eld experimental study of List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) supports
such knowledge of charity fund-raisers.6 They divide 3,000 potential donors
into six groups. To three groups with 500 potential donors each, they solicit
the donation of a laboratory for environmental studies to purchase a com-
puter with the ¯xed cost of $3,000 with di®erent seed money.7 To the ¯rst
group, they announce that seed contribution is $300, to the second group,
$1000, and to the third group, $2,000. The result is provided in Table 1.
They clearly demonstrate that the total amount of contributions, the pro-
portion of donors who actually contribute, and the per-capita amount of
contribution strictly and continuously increase according to the amount of
seed money.
[Table 1 enters around here.]
5Famous applications of the global game include the pricing debt problem (Morris and
Shin, 2004) and bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005). Both are typical coordination
problems.
6Other empirical studies on seed money include List and Rondeau (2003) and Potters
et al. (2005).
7The other three groups of potential donors are allocated to the experiment of refunds.
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There is considerable theoretical literature on the e®ect of seed money,
and most of them are broadly divided into two types. The ¯rst focuses on
the e®ect of seed money to shift the minimal cost of project success. It
considers that since the threshold costs for project success decreases due to
seed money, the total contribution increases. We call this e®ect the threshold
shift e®ect of seed money. This e®ect is only available to consider capital
campaigns with ¯xed project costs. Studies based on a discrete public good
provision model such as Andreoni (1998), Menezes et al. (2001), and Bac and
Bag (2003) constitute this type. The second type of research focuses on the
uncertainty of potential donors about the quality of charity. It explains that
the existence of seed money credits the high quality of charity and increases
the contribution from donors. We call this e®ect the quality signal e®ect
of seed money. Vesterlund (2003) and Andreoni (2006a) are examples of
such studies. The explanation by the quality signal e®ect has an advantage
since it is available not only to capital campaigns but continuing campaigns
without any ¯xed costs.8
Our model demonstrates that by an exclusive consideration of the thresh-
old shift e®ect of seed money, the proportion of donors and the total amount
of donation strictly and continuously increase to match the amount of seed
money. This result is quite compatible with the ¯eld experimental study
of List and Lucking-Reiley (2002), and supports the view that charitable
giving actually involves a coordination game. Indeed, we can construct a
model in which the threshold shift e®ect and the quality signal e®ect are
complementary explanations for the e®ect of seed money. Our coordination
game model and the results are meaningful even if we take the quality signal
e®ect of seed money into account.
1.3 The Structure of the Paper
The structure of this paper is follows. In Section 2, we examine the ba-
sic model of charitable giving without seed money. In 2.1, we construct a
model based on a simple global coordination game. In 2.2, we derive the
equilibrium. In 2.3, we see the conditions for e±ciency of agents and project
success in this model. In Section 3, we consider the e®ect of seed money.
In 3.1, we introduce seed money with the threshold shift e®ect, and see the
impact on the behavior of potential donors. In 3.2, we calculate the minimal
seed money for both project e±ciency and success. In Section 4, we discuss
the still remaining inconsistency with List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) and
conceivable solutions for this inconsistency. Section 5 concludes. All proofs
8There are other types of explanations about the e®ect of seed money. Romano and
Yildirim (2001) show that in a two stage game of a continuing public good provision,
due to the warm-glow property itself, the announcement of the contributions in the ¯rst
stage sometimes brings larger total contributions. Bag and Roy (2008) explain it by the
uncertainty for other donors' valuations about the project.
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of propositions and remarks are in the Appendix.
2 Basic Model and Results
In this section, we present a model of charitable giving that becomes a
foundation for further comparative static analysis. The e®ect of seed money
is not considered yet. We present the detailed game structure in 2.1, derive a
unique equilibrium in 2.2, and provide remarks on the e±ciency and project
success in 2.3.
2.1 Preliminaries
There is a charity project and n 2 N potential donors (agents). The project
has a nonconvex technology. There exists a threshold level of its cost C 2
R++, and if the total provision from agents exceeds the threshold C, then
the quality of the project is signi¯cantly improved. Imagine, for example,
a charitable campaign to promote child health care in a rural area of a
developing country. If the charity collects su±cient donation to build a
hospital, the quality of the project would rise notably. We call the project a
success (in the ex-post sense) if the collected donation from agents is enough
to cover C, and a failure (in the ex-post sense) if the total donation is less
than C.
We consider cases wherein the number of agents is adequately large.9 We
adopt the assumption of a continuum of agents. To simplify the analysis, we
normalize the length of the continuum of agents to 1. Let c = Cn . Under the
normalized setting, c plays a role as the threshold cost instead of C. Thus
we call c the threshold cost as well.
The charity announces the threshold cost c and solicits agents for dona-
tion. Through the announcement, each agent receives a signal of how worth
the project is in both cases of project success and failure. Based on this sig-
nal, each agent makes a decision on whether to donate or not. To simplify
the analysis, we assume that her decision is merely a choice from her action
set fDonate;Not Donateg, and the amount of donation on the basis of her
signal is given exogenously.10
Let vi 2 R be the signal of the project value for an agent i in the case
of project success (ex-post sense). vi > 0 means that i thinks the project
value is positive and it is worth donating a positive amount of money if it
9In each ¯eld experiment of List and Lucking-Reiley (2002), the number of potential
donors (people who took solicitation letters) was 500.
10It is widely adopted as a simpli¯cation technique to limit the elements of each agent's
action set binary in literatures of global games. See, for example, Morris and Shin (2003).
Moreover, even in the classical models of a discrete public good provision such as Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1984) and Gradstein (1994), the elements of action set are limited binary
to reduce complexities.
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succeeds. vi · 0 means that she thinks the project is not worthwhile and
donating to it would be wasteful. In the case of vi · 0, consider that the
absolute value jvij represents the degree of dislike for the project.
Assume that if vi > 0, she donates x(vi) when she makes a decision
Donate, where x : R+ ! R+ is the same function among all agents, and
possesses the properties of twice di®erentiability, and for all v > 0, 0 <
x(v) < v, x0(v) > 0 and x00(v) · 0. (i.e., x(¢) is a weakly concave function.)
Furthermore, assume that limv!0 x(v) = 0, limv!+1 x(v) = +1 and there
exists ® 2 (0; 1) such that limv!0 x0(v) = ®. Note that v(¢) represents a
wide class of functions including the constant function x : R+ ! R+ such
that for all v > 0, x(v) = ®v.
Moreover, assume that if vi · 0, she donates ² > 0 if she decides to
Donate. In the case of vi · 0, it is natural to consider that in equilibria, she
never decides to donate. The amount ² > 0 is a technical assumption.
We assume throughout the paper that if the project is a failure, any
agent i thinks that in the ex-post, the project is not attractive and the
amount of donation with a minus sign itself is her payo®. Also assume that
any agent has zero payo® if she does not donate, regardless of whether the
project is a success or a failure.11
The payo® tables below summarises them.
If vi > 0,
Success Failure
Donate vi ¡ x(vi) ¡x(vi)
Not Donate 0 0
If vi · 0,
Success Failure
Donate vi ¡ ² ¡²
Not Donate 0 0
Based on these ex-post payo® tables, each agent is assumed to calculate the
von Neumann-Morgenstern expected interim payo® of her own, and decide
whether she donates or not.
Let us introduce the signal distribution structure and information set-
ting for agents. Assume that the signal for each agent vi follows a normal
distribution with mean µ and standard deviation ¾ independently and iden-
tically. Since the density function for a normal distribution approximates a
wide class of symmetric density functions with a peak, this assumption is
adequate.12 Let F (¢; µ) denote the normal cumulative distribution function
11This assumption is based on the warm-glow property discussed in the Introduction.
12In the ¯eld experiments of List and Lucking-Reiley (2002), all potential donors met
two criteria: (i) the household's annual income was above $70,000, and (ii) the household
was known to have previously given to a charity. In this case, the standard deviation ¾ is
relatively small.
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with mean µ and standard deviation ¾, and f(¢; µ) denote its probability
density function.
Following Morris and Shin (2003), we assume that it is common knowl-
edge among agents that each signal vi for an agent i is independently, iden-
tically, and normally distributed with standard deviation ¾. However, each
agent i has no information about the mean µ. She has to predict the mean µ
on the basis of her realized signal vi. We assume that her prior belief for µ is
uniformly distributed over the real line R. This prior belief is improper since
the total probability mass is in¯nite, however, the posterior belief through
Bayesian estimation is well de¯ned.13 She believes based on her signal vi
that µ follows the normal distribution with mean vi and standard deviation
¾. This is to say, from her point of view, F (¢; vi) is the cumulative distri-
bution function of the actual mean µ, and f(¢; vi) is its probability density
function. It is an interesting aspect of this improper uniform prior belief
that the same function is available to represent both the distribution of real
signals and the distribution of predictable mean based on belief of one agent.
In comparison with a standard Bayesian game wherein the signal distri-
bution is common knowledge among agents, the assumption that the poste-
rior belief of signal distribution for each agent is slightly di®erent from those
of others is quite natural. This is because, ¯rst, in a large economy where a
continuum can approximate the total agents, if the distribution of signals is
common knowledge, it almost represents a complete information game. It
appears unrealistic. Second, especially when agents are relatively homoge-
neous (i.e., ¾ is small) as in the ¯eld experiments of List and Lucking-Reiley
(2002), it is reasonable that each agent predicts the signal distribution on
the basis of her own signal.
A strategy for an agent i is a function mapping her receiving signal vi to
her action set fDonate;Not Donateg. If both actions occasion the equivalent
expected payo® for i, we assume she selects Not Donate. This assumption
is just to simplify the description, and the opposite assumption is of course
available.
At this point, a Bayesian type of incomplete information game is de¯ned.
In the next subsection, we consider the equilibrium in this game.
2.2 The Equilibrium
We are interested in Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game de¯ned in the pre-
vious subsection. If possible, a unique equilibrium is preferable especially
for the purpose of comparative statics. The global game analysis makes it
possible to provide a unique equilibrium with a few natural additional as-
sumptions to the strategies of agents. Furthermore, it is the strategy pro¯le
surviving the iterated elimination of interim strictly dominated strategies.
13See Morris and Shin (2003) for a detailed explanation. They discuss this improper
uniform prior belief with respect to the philosophy of Laplace.
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Since this concept does not rely on the assumption that the strategies of
other agents are common knowledge, it is a weaker condition than Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
In this subsection, we characterize a unique strategy pro¯le by the iter-
ated elimination of interim strictly dominated strategies as the equilibrium.
The equilibrium strategy possesses two interesting properties: symmetry
and threshold properties. A strategy is symmetric if all agents follow the
same strategy. A strategy is a threshold strategy around some cuto® point
k 2 R if there exists a unique cuto® point k such that if her receiving signal
vi is above k, she donates and otherwise, she does not donate. A symmetric
threshold strategy s : R ! fDonate, Not Donateg is formally written as
follows.
s(vi) =
(
Donate if vi > k
Not Donate if vi · k
Note that symmetry and threshold properties of the equilibrium are not the
assumptions but are obtained endogenously.
We introduce several functions that play important roles in the following
investigation. Z 1
k
f(v; µ)dv (1)Z 1
k
x(v)f(v; µ)dv (2)
(1) represents the proportion of agents whose signal is larger than k when
the mean of signals is µ. This function is useful no matter what strategies
are adopted. (2) represents the total donation when the mean of signals is
µ and any agent receiving a signal larger than the cuto® point k decides to
donate. (2) is meaningful only when the threshold strategy is adopted by
any agent.
At the beginning of the investigation, notice the remark below.
Remark 1. For any agent i with vi < 0, Not Donate is the strictly dominant
strategy.
This remark is straightforward from the payo® tables of the previous
section, and has an important role in the global game analysis. We need a
similar property that for an agent i with a large enough signal vi, Donate is
the strictly dominant strategy.
Remember that we assume the number of agents to be large and ap-
proximated by a continuum of agents with length 1. Therefore, an agent
regards her contribution itself as zero even if she donates a positive amount
of money. However, it is not natural that an agent with so large a signal
that her own contribution covers the whole project cost C (i.e., an agent i
with signal vi > 0 such that x(vi) > C) would consider her contribution to
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be zero. Notice that it is not normalized cost c but the original C. Since
her actual contribution covers the whole cost C, she has no reason to fear
the project failure.
Assumption 1 below represents the above discussion. Let V 2 R++ be
such that x(V ) = C.
Assumption 1. For any agent i with vi > V , Donate is the strictly dominant
strategy.
Note that the interim payo® of an agent i with a positive signal vi > 0
is represented by
Pr(Success)(vi ¡ x(vi)) + (1¡ Pr(Success))(¡x(vi)): (3)
Thus, agent i decides to donate if
(3) > 0
() Pr(Success) > x(vi)
vi
:
Since limvi!0 x(vi) = 0 and limvi!0 x0(vi) = ®, we have
lim
vi!0
x(vi)
vi
= ® (by l'Hospital's rule.)
Let a function p : R+ ! R++ be such that
p(vi) =
(
x(vi)
vi
if vi > 0
® if vi = 0:
p(vi) represents the threshold probability such that i with vi > 0 considers
if the probability of project success is larger than p(vi), Donate leads to a
higher expected payo® than Not Donate. On the other hand, if the proba-
bility of project success is less than p(vi), Not Donate guarantees a higher
expected payo® than Donate. The reason that p(0) is de¯ned as the limit
value at vi ! 0 is just to simplify the following descriptions. Since x(¢) is
weakly concave and di®erentiable in vi > 0, we have a remark below.
Remark 2. p(¢) is weakly decreasing and continuous in vi ¸ 0.
[Figure 1 enters around here.]
Let µ^ : R+ ! R be a function such that for vi ¸ 0,Z 1
µ^(vi)
f(v; vi)dv = p(vi):14
14In the explicit form, µ^(vi) = F
¡1(1¡p(vi); vi), where F¡1(¢; vi) is the inverse function
of F (¢; vi). This expression is rarely used in the following investigation.
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See Figure 1 for the illustration. Remember that an agent i with a signal
vi believes the mean of normally distributed signals to be vi itself. Thus
the equation represents that i considers the probability of that the mean of
signal distribution to be larger than µ^(vi) is p(vi). (i.e., i considers Pr(µ ¸
µ(vi)) = p(vi).) Note that since p(0) = ® 2 (0; 1), µ^(0) 2 R. Since p(¢) is
weakly decreasing in vi ¸ 0, we have the remark below.
Remark 3. (i) µ^(vi) is strictly increasing and continuous in vi ¸ 0. (ii) For
v0i > vi ¸ 0, µ^(v0i)¡ µ^(vi) ¸ v0i ¡ vi. (iii) limv!+1 µ^(v) = +1.
We introduce two more functions and discuss their properties.Z 1
k
x(v)f(v; µ^(vi))dv (4)
(4) is a special case of (2), and the mean of signals is µ^(vi). Since µ^(vi) is
strictly increasing in vi ¸ 0, the following remark is straightforward.
Remark 4. (4) is strictly increasing and continuous in vi ¸ 0 and strictly
decreasing and continuous in k ¸ 0.Z 1
vi
x(v)f(v; µ^(vi))dv (5)
(5) is a special case of (4). The mean of signals is µ^(vi) and the cuto® point
k = vi. Remark 3 induces the next remark.
Remark 5. (5) is strictly increasing and continuous in vi ¸ 0.
Before characterizing the equilibrium, we add one more assumptions.
Assumption 2.
R1
V x(v)f(v; µ^(V ))dv ¸ c
Assumption 2 states that if the mean of signals is µ^(V ) and agents with
signals more than V donate, the total donation from agents with signals
more than V is larger than c and the project is a success. As already
discussed when we introduced Assumption 1, the signal V is so large that
x(V ) = C. Since µ^(V ) is also large in accordance with V , it is also a natural
assumption.
Let G denote the Bayesian type of incomplete information game de¯ned
in Subsection 2.1 with Assumption 1 and 2. Now, we characterize a cuto®
point and the equilibrium. Given a threshold cost c, let
k¤ =
(
0 if
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ^(0))dv ¸ c
· otherwise,
where · 2 R++ satis¯es Z 1
·
x(v)f(v; µ^(·))dv = c:
Notice that since (5) diverges to in¯nity when vi goes to in¯nity (i.e., (5)!
+1 (vi ! +1)), · is uniquely determined if
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ^(0))dv < c.
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Proposition 1. Let a symmetric threshold strategy s¤(¢) be such that
s¤(vi) =
(
Donate if vi > k¤
Not Donate if vi · k¤:
Then, in a game G, s¤(¢) constitutes a unique strategy pro¯le surviving the
iterated elimination of interim strictly dominated strategies.
Note that from the de¯nition of k¤, the actual mean of signal distribution
µ has no e®ect in determining the equilibrium cuto® point k¤. In contrast,
µ^(¢) is quite important in determining k¤. The example below illustrates the
proposition.
Example 1. Let a threshold level of cost c = 6.15 Let a standard deviation
of signal distribution ¾ = 10. Let for all vi > 0, x(vi) = 12vi. Then, for all
vi > 0, p(vi) = 12 and µ^(vi) = vi. We calculate k
¤ = 4:02115, and have Table
2.
[Table 2 enters around here.]
Note that the proportion of actual contributors is represented byZ 1
k¤
f(v; µ)dv (6)
and the total amount of donation is represented byZ 1
k¤
x(v)f(v; µ)dv: (7)
The mean amount of donation from actual contributors is (7)=(6), and the
project is a success if (7) is larger than c.
As in Example 1, the equilibrium cuto® point k¤ is often larger than
0. It is due to the particular assumption of global game that each agent
possesses a di®erent belief about the signal distribution. Under a standard
Bayesian game model where the signal distribution and strategies of other
agents constitute common knowledge, all agents with signals larger than 0
together decide whether to donate or not depending on the actual mean
of signal µ in an equilibrium. Under the same setting as in Example 1,
the standard Bayesian game analysis provides us that in an equilibrium, if
µ > 4:02115, agents with signals larger than 0 together decide to donate, and
if µ · 4:02115, any agent does not donate and the total amount of donation
is equal to zero. It is a quite incompatible prediction with empirical research
such as List and Lucking-Reiley (2002). It suggests the e®ectiveness of global
game analysis in studies of charitable giving.
15In each ¯eld experiment of List and Lucking-Reiley (2002), the threshold level of
project cost for success is $3,000 and the number of potential donors is 500. (i.e., C =
3; 000 and n = 500.) In this case, c = C=n = 6.
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2.3 Conditions for E±ciency and Success
In this subsection, we ¯rst consider the condition that achieves the ex-post
Pareto e±ciency of the donation for agents. Next, we consider the condition
for project success.
We call the project is e±cient if in the equilibrium, the action of agents
constitutes the ex-post Pareto e±cient. Formally, it is represented by that
if
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ)dv ¸ c, any agent i with signal vi > 0 chooses Donate and
any agent j with signal vj · 0 chooses Not Donate, and otherwise, all agents
select Not Donate. It is achievable in a equilibrium of the standard Bayesian
Game discussed in the last paragraph of the previous subsection. However,
under the more realistic global game setting, it is hardly obtained. In a
game G, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2. A project is e±cient if and only if k¤ = 0 and
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ)dv ¸
c.
Actually, it is equivalent to the condition for project success when k¤ = 0.
The intuition of this proposition is quite simple. Even though the project is
a failure, some agents with signals larger than k¤ choose Donate. It implies
that the project is not e±cient. If the project is a success and k¤ > 0, an
agent i with 0 < vi < k¤ chooses Not Donate. It brings ine±ciency. There-
fore, the condition that occasions e±ciency is only described in Proposition
2.
As already mentioned in the previous subsection, a project is a success
if Z 1
k¤
x(v)f(v; µ)dv ¸ c: (8)
It may be the most important matter for a charity fund-raiser. Note that if
a project is e±cient, then the project is a success. Besides, even in the case
of k¤ > 0, the project is a success as the proposition below states.
Proposition 3. A project is a success if and only if it is e±cient or µ ¸
µ^(k¤).
If k¤ > 0,
R1
k¤ x(v)f(v; µ^(k
¤))dv = c. Thus µ ¸ µ^(k¤) induces R1k¤ x(v)f(v; µ)dv ¸
c and the project succeeds.
In the next section, we introduce seed money. The main purpose to
introduce seed money is to obtain project success or e±ciency. We show how
to calculate the minimal amount of seed money for both project e±ciency
and success.
3 Seed Money
We introduce seed money exogenously. We see the threshold shift e®ect of
the seed money to the donation behavior of agents in 3.1. We also see how
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to obtain the project success and e±ciency by announcing seed money in
3.2.
3.1 The Threshold Shift E®ect
Let L 2 [0; C) denote the amount of seed money. L = 0 represents the
state wherein no seed money is granted. If seed money L is granted, the
threshold level for project success shifts from C to C ¡ L. Assume that
noti¯ed information about the project never changes except the existence
of seed money and its amount. We consider that all other structures of the
game except the shift of threshold for the project success remain the same.
Let ` denote a normalized version of seed money, i.e., ` = Ln . Con-
sequently, the normalized version of the shifted threshold is c ¡ `. We
also rewrite the additional assumptions in Subsection 2.2 as follows. Let
V (`) 2 R++ be such that x(V (`)) = C ¡ L.
Assumption 1'. For any agent i with vi > V (`), Donate is the strictly
dominant strategy.
Assumption 2'.
R1
V (`) x(v)f(v; µ^(V (`)))dv ¸ c¡ `.
Let G(`) denote a Bayesian game with the same structure as that in
Subsection 2.1 with the shift of threshold level from c to c¡ ` and Assump-
tions 1' and 2'. Then we derive a unique equilibrium strategy s¤(¢; `) in a
game G(`) as a corollary of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. In a game G(`), a symmetric threshold strategy s¤(¢; `) such
that
s¤(vi; `) =
(
Donate if vi > k¤(`)
Not Donate if vi · k¤(`);
where
k¤(`) =
(
0 if
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ^(0))dv ¸ c¡ `
·(`) otherwise,
and ·(`) 2 R++ is such thatZ 1
·(`)
x(v)f(v; µ^(·(`)))dv = c¡ `
constitutes a unique strategy pro¯le surviving the iterated elimination of in-
terim strictly dominated strategies.
Hereafter, we consider the case of
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ^(0))dv < c. Otherwise,
not only project success but e±ciency is obtained without seed money, and
the introduction of seed money is redundant. Let ` = c¡R10 x(v)f(v; µ^(0))dv.
According to Corollary 1, we have the remark below.
14
Remark 6. k¤(`) is strictly decreasing and continuous in ` < `, and k¤(`0) = 0
for `0 ¸ `.
From Remark 6, we derive a proposition below which is quite compatible
with the ¯eld experiment of List and Lucking-Reiley (2002).
Proposition 4. If a granted seed money ` strictly increases, then both the
proportion of agents who decide to donate and the total amount of donation
strictly increase as long as ` < `.
The example below illustrates this proposition.
Example 2. Similarly to Example 1, let a threshold level of cost c = 6,
a standard deviation of signal distribution ¾ = 10, and for all vi > 0,
x(vi) = 12vi. Consequently, we have the results in Table 3.
[Table 3 enters around here.]
The mechanism behind Proposition 4 is quite simple. It only depends
on Remark 6. If k¤(`) decreases, it is obvious that the number of agents
with signal larger than the cuto® point k¤(`) strictly increases, and then
the proportion of agents who decide to donate and the total amount of
donation also strictly increase. As discussed in the last part of Subsection
2.2, the emergence of the cuto® point k¤(`) strictly larger than 0 is due to the
global game assumption that the actual signal distribution is not common
knowledge but noisily observed and guessed by each agent i on the basis
of her signal vi. This realistic setting of the global game is the key to the
derivation of Proposition 4.
3.2 Minimal Seed Money for E±ciency and Success
The main purpose for introducing seed money is to obtain the project e±-
ciency or project success when they are not achieved without seed money.
Especially from the view point of charity fund-raiser, attaining the project
success is crucial. Even though we do not explicitly consider the cost to
introduce seed money, charity fund-raisers actually require a considerable
e®ort to collect seed money, and are better o® if the amount of seed money
for the project e±ciency or success is as small as possible. In this subsection,
we derive a minimal amount of seed money to attain both project e±ciency
and success.
First, consider the minimal seed money for e±ciency. Note that without
seed money, the project is not e±cient if k¤(0) > 0 or
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ)dv < c.
In this case, we have the following proposition.
15
Proposition 5. The minimal amount of seed money for project e±ciency
` is such that
` =
(
c¡ R10 x(v)f(v; µ^(0))dv if µ ¸ µ^(0)
c¡ R10 x(v)f(v; µ)dv otherwise.
This proposition is straightforward from Proposition 2. If µ ¸ µ^(0), the
amount of seed money to guarantee that agents with signals larger than 0
choose Donate is su±cient. If µ < µ^(0), we need enough seed money ` so
that the shifted threshold c ¡ ` is weakly smaller than the possible total
amount. (i.e., c¡ ` · R10 x(v)f(v; µ)dv.)
Next, we consider the minimal seed money for project success. The
project is not a success without seed money if it is not e±cient and µ <
µ^(k¤(0)). In this case, in order to achieve the project success, we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 6. The minimal amount of seed money for the project success
`¤ is such that if µ^(0) · µ < µ^(k¤(0)), µ^(k¤(`¤)) = µ, and if µ < µ^(0),
`¤ = c¡ R10 x(v)f(v; µ)dv.
Note that from Remarks 3 and 6, in the case of µ^(0) · µ < µ^(k¤(0)),
µ^(k¤(`)) is continuously and strictly decreasing in ` 2 [0; `]. Thus `¤ is
uniquely determined. In this case, the minimal seed money for project
success is strictly smaller than that for e±ciency, which suits our intuition.
In Example 2, in the case of µ = 0, both ` = `¤ = 2:01058. However, in the
case of µ = 2, ` = 2:01058 and `¤ = 1:01058.
To calculate the minimal seed money for project e±ciency and success,
a charity fund-raiser needs to know the actual mean of the distribution µ.
Indeed, to collect an actual signal distribution is quite di±cult for a charity
fund-raiser. It involves a considerable cost for preliminary surveys on the
potential donors to near the actual mean µ, and it is very bene¯cial.16
4 Discussion
In the previous section, we establish Proposition 4 that is quite compatible
with the empirical result of List and Lucking-Reiley (2002). In this section,
we discuss the still remaining inconsistency of our model with List and
Lucking-Reiley (2002). In our model, the per-capita amount of donation
16If agents know the actual signal distribution, e±ciency is obtained in an equilibrium.
Thus the question arises \if charity fund-raiser announces the mean of distribution based
on preliminary surveys, isn't e±ciency obtained?" The answer may be \No" since agents
suspect that strategic manipulation by charity fund-raiser with regard to the mean takes
place. Certain studies on global game construct models with posterior belief of an agent
on the basis of both her private and publicly announced signals. See, for example, Morris
and Shin (2002, 2003) and Angeletos et al. (2006).
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strictly decreases along with the increase of seed money, whereas the per-
capita amount of donation strictly increases corresponding to the increase
of seed money in List and Lucking-Reiley (2002). We discuss where this
inconsistency come from and how to solve it.
In the previous section, Example 2 demonstrates that the per-capita
amount of donation is strictly decreasing in regard to the amount of seed
money. The mechanism is quite simple. We assume that the amount of do-
nation x(vi) of agent i with signal vi is exogenously given and never changed
to the amount of seed money. From Remark 6, if the amount of seed money
increases, the threshold signal k¤(`) decreases. Note that an agent who
changes her action from Not Donate to Donate due to the increase of seed
money has a smaller signal and a smaller donation than agents who choose
to Donate from the beginning. It induces the per-capita amount of donation
to decrease.
To remove this inconsistency in the extended version of our model, we
need to increase x(vi) according to the increase of seed money. Two ap-
proaches are considerable for this purpose.
One is to render x(vi) endogenously determined as an optimal value
corresponding to the probability of success. This relies on the assumption
that the e®ect of seed money is only the threshold shift e®ect. Since the
probability of success depends on the amount of donation obtained from
other agents, this optimization problem is highly complicated. At present,
we are not sure whether this approach makes sense or not.
The other approach entails the introduction of the e®ect of seed money
as quality signal. The increase of x(vi) corresponding to the increase of seed
money is considered to be the consequence of the quality signal e®ect of
seed money. For example, consider the simple introduction of the quality
signal e®ect as follows. Let µ be the mean of each agent's signal, similarly
to Section 2. Let µ : [0; c) ! R be a strictly increasing and continuous
function such that µ(0) = µ. Assume that when seed money ` is granted,
the mean of signal µ is shifted to µ(`). Moreover, assume that the standard
deviation ¾ remains the same. We interpret this shift of µ to µ(`) as that an
agent i receiving a signal vi when no seed money is granted receives a signal
vi(`) = vi + (µ(`) ¡ µ) when seed money ` is granted. It is obvious that in
this model, the inconsistency about the per-capita amount of donation is
resolved.17
The second explanation also suggests that we can construct a model in
which the threshold shift e®ect and the quality signal e®ect of seed money are
complementary. Which e®ect actually works is still an interesting question
in both theoretical and empirical studies.
17An interesting aspect of the previous literature that considers the e®ect of seed money
as quality signal such as Vesterlund (2003) and Andreoni (2006a) is that the contributors
for seed money and the amount of seed money are determined endogenously.
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5 Concluding Remark
In this paper, we construct a global coordination game model of charitable
giving, and show that merely by considering the threshold e®ect of seed
money, the proportion of agents that decides to donate and the total amount
of donations strictly and continuously increase according to the increase of
seed money.
We construct a simultaneous model to be compared with the empirical
study of List and Lucking-Reiley (2002). However, the actual capital cam-
paigns of charities usually allow agents to donate in a certain period, and
may be represented by dynamic games. Even in the dynamic models, our
view that the charitable donation is indeed a coordination game if potential
donors possess the warm-glow properties in their preferences plays an im-
portant role.18 We hope that this paper encourages the further studies of
donation behavior and helps future charity projects.
Appendix
In the Appendix, we provide proofs of Propositions and Remarks. We omit
proofs of Remarks 1 and 4 since they are straightforward.
Proof of Remark 2. The continuity and di®erentiability of p(¢) are obvious.
Note that for vi > 0,
p0(vi) =
¡x(vi) + vix0(vi)
v2i
:
Since x(¢) is weakly concave in vi > 0, ¡x(vi)+ vix0(vi) · 0. It implies that
for vi > 0, p0(vi) · 0, and p(vi) is weakly decreasing in vi ¸ 0.
Proof of Remark 3. Remember that
R1
µ^(vi)
f(v; vi)dv = p(vi) for vi > 0.
Since p(¢) is weakly decreasing in vi ¸ 0 by Remark 2, for v0i > vi > 0,Z 1
µ^(vi)
f(v; vi)dv = p(vi) ¸ p(v0i) =
Z 1
µ^(v0i)
f(v; v0i)dv:
Thus the continuity of p(¢) implies (i) µ^(vi) is strictly increasing and contin-
uous in vi ¸ 0.
Note that if p(vi) = p(v0i), µ^(v
0
i) ¡ µ^(vi) = v0i ¡ vi and if p(vi) > p(v0i),
µ^(v0i) ¡ µ^(vi) ¸ v0i ¡ vi. (See Figure 2 for the illustration.) They imply (ii)
for v0i > vi ¸ 0, µ^(v0i)¡ µ^(vi) ¸ v0i ¡ vi.
Since µ^(0) 2 R, the construction of µ^(vi) as
R1
µ^(vi)
f(v; vi)dv = p(vi)
implies (iii) limv!+1 µ^(v) = +1.
18Famous dynamic models of investments in projects include Admiti and Perry (1991)
and Marx and Matthews (2000). Dynamic models of investments in projects in the global
game framework are, for example, Heidhues and Melissas (2006) and Dasgupta (2007).
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[Figure 2 enters around here.]
Proof of Remark 5. Let v0 > v > 0. Since µ^(v0i)¡ µ^(vi) ¸ v0i¡ vi by Remark
3,
R1
vi
f(v; µ^(vi))dv ·
R1
v0i
f(v; µ^(v0i))dv. Since x(¢) is a strictly increasing
function, it implies thatZ 1
vi
x(v)f(v; µ^(vi))dv <
Z 1
v0i
x(v)f(v; µ^(v0i))dv:
We have the statement of the remark.
Proof of Proposition 1. Proposition 2.1 of Morris and Shin (2003) provides
the equilibrium of a general global game where the (ex-post) payo® of an
agent depends on her action, the proportion of other agents' strategies,
and her own signal. Even though in our game G, the payo® of an agent
depends on her action, the total amount of donation, and her own signal,
our Proposition 1 is essentially the same as their Proposition 2.1. We owe
Morris and Shin (2003) and originally Carlsson and van Damme (1993) their
proof techniques.
Case 1:
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ^(0))dv < c.
(A) First, we construct a sequence of recursive values v0; v1; v2; ¢ ¢ ¢ such
that for agents with signals larger than each value, Not Donate is the interim
strictly dominated strategy.
By Assumption 1, for any agent i with vi > V , Donate is the strictly
dominant strategy, and Not Donate is strictly dominated. Let v0 = V .
Let t 2 N [ f0g. Assume as an induction hypothesis that for any agent
i with vi > vt, Not Donate is the interim strictly dominated strategy, and
they choose to Donate. Let vt+1 be such thatZ 1
vt
x(v)f(v; µ^(vt+1))dv = c: (9)
Suppose, at ¯rst, that all the other agents with signals smaller than
vt choose Not Donate. Then, (9) represents that if the mean of signals is
µ^(vt+1), the total amount of donation equals c. Thus if the mean of signals
is larger than µ^(vt+1), the project is a success.
Note that for an agent i with vi > vt+1, Pr(µ ¸ µ^(vt+1)) > Pr(µ ¸
µ^(vi)) = p(vi) since µ^(vi) > µ^(vt+1). It means that for i's point of view,
the probability of success is larger than p(vi), and Donate is more pro¯table
than Not Donate.
Notice that if we drop the supposition that all other agents with signals
smaller than vt choose Not Donate, the probability of success for i with
vi > v
t+1 is higher than that with the supposition. Thus, for i with vi > vt+1,
Not Donate is the interim strictly dominated strategy.
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Next, we show that · · vt+1 · vt · V .
First, notice · · V = v0 by Assumption 2 and Remark 5.
Assume as induction hypothesis that · · vt. Then R1· x(v)f(v; µ^(·))dv =
c by the de¯nition of · and Remark 5 imply thatZ 1
vt
x(v)f(v; µ^(vt))dv ¸ c: (10)
(9), (10) and Remark 4 imply that vt ¸ vt+1. Similarly, since · · vt,R1
· x(v)f(v; µ^(·))dv = c, (9) and Remark 4 imply v
t+1 ¸ ·. Hence · ·
vt+1 · vt · V .
By the recursive way, we have that the sequence v0; v1; v2; ¢ ¢ ¢ is weakly
decreasing and has an lower bound ·. Thus it has the limit value. Let v
be the limit value. (i.e., limt!+1 vt = v.) Since (4) is continuous in both
k and vi by Remark 4, we have that
R1
v x(v)f(v; µ^(v))dv = c. It implies
v = ·.
(B) Similarly, we can construct a sequence of recursive values v0; v1; v2; ¢ ¢ ¢
such that for agents with signals smaller than each value, Donate is the in-
terim strictly dominated strategy.
Let v0 = 0. Given t 2 N [ f0g, let vt+1 be such thatZ 1
vt
x(v)f(v; µ^(vt+1))dv = c:
Then, Remark 1 and the symmetric reasoning of (A) guarantee that for
agents with signals smaller than each value, Donate is the interim strictly
dominated strategy.
Similarly to (A), we have that 0 · vt < vt+1 < · for any t 2 N [ f0g,
and limt!+1 vt = ·.
By the discussions (A) and (B), we have the statement of Case 1.
Case 2:
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ^(0))dv ¸ c.
(A) We can use the same reasoning of (A) in Case 1 with only one
modi¯cation. Instead of (9), letting
vt+1 =
(
0 if
R1
vt x(v)f(v; µ^(0))dv ¸ c
wt+1 otherwise,
where wt+1 2 R+ is such that
R1
vt x(v)f(v; µ^(w
t+1))dv = c.
Then we have that 0 · vt+1 · vt · V for any t 2 N [ f0g, and
limt!+1 vt = 0.
(B) Since Remark 1 says that for any agent i with vi < 0, Not Donate
is strictly dominant.
By the discussions (A) and (B), we have the statement for Case 2.
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Proof of Proposition 2. The if part is obvious. The only if part is explained
in the paragraph after this proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. if part : It is obvious that e±ciency implies project
success. The explanation for the case of µ ¸ µ^(k¤) is given in the paragraph
after this proposition. only if part : We show the contraposition. Suppose
µ < µ^(k¤) and (k¤ > 0 or
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ)dv < c). If
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ)dv < c,
the project is never a success. If µ < µ^(k¤) and k¤ > 0, then
R1
k¤ x(v)f(v; µ^(k
¤))dv =
c >
R1
k¤ x(v)f(v; µ)dv. It induces the project failure.
Proof of Remark 6. In the case of ` ¸ `, k¤(`) = 0 is directly induced from
Corollary 1. We consider the case of ` < `. Let a small ² > 0. Then, from
Corollary 1, we haveZ 1
k¤(`)
x(v)f(v; µ^(k¤(`)))dv = c¡ ` (11)
and Z 1
k¤(`+²)
x(v)f(v; µ^(k¤(`+ ²)))dv = c¡ (`+ ²): (12)
By subtracting both sides of (12) from those of (11), we haveZ 1
k¤(`)
x(v)f(v; µ^(k¤(`)))dv ¡
Z 1
k¤(`+²)
x(v)f(v; µ^(k¤(`+ ²)))dv = ² > 0: (13)
Remark 5 and (13) imply k¤(`) > k¤(` + ²). Hence, k¤(`) is strictly
decreasing and continuous in ` < `.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let ` < `. Note that, under this condition, the
proportion of agents who decide to donate is represented by
R1
k¤(`) f(v; µ)dv
and the total amount of donation is given by
R1
k¤(`) x(v)f(v; µ)dv. Since both
are strictly decreasing in k¤(`), Remark 6 induces the statement.
Proof of Proposition 5. First consider the case of µ ¸ µ^(0). Let ` ¸ `. ThenR1
0 x(v)f(v; µ)dv ¸
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ^(0))dv ¸ c ¡ `. It occasions the project
success and k¤(`) = 0. Thus it is e±cient. On the other hand, let `0 < `.
Then
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ^(0))dv = c ¡ ` < c ¡ `0. Then k¤(`0) > 0 and it brings
ine±ciency.
Next, we consider the other case, in which µ < µ^(0). Let ` ¸ `.
Then
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ^(0))dv ¸
R1
0 x(v)f(v; µ)dv ¸ c ¡ `. It occasions the
project success and k¤(`) = 0. Thus it is e±cient. Let `0 < `. ThenR1
0 x(v)f(v; µ)dv = c ¡ ` < c ¡ `0. It occasions the project failure and
ine±ciency.
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Proof of Proposition 6. First consider the case of µ^(0) · µ < µ^(k¤(`¤)). Let
` ¸ `¤. Remark 6 implies that k¤(`) · k¤(`¤). Thus we have µ^(k¤(`)) ·
µ^(k¤(`¤)) = µ. Since Corollary 1 states thatZ 1
k¤(`)
x(v)f(v; µ^(k¤(`)))dv = c¡ `;
µ^(k¤(`)) · µ implies thatZ 1
k¤(`)
x(v)f(v; µ)dv ¸ c¡ `:
It occasions the project success. Let `0 < `¤. Then the symmetric reasoning
brings us
R1
k¤(`0) x(v)f(v; µ)dv < c¡ `0. It induces the project failure.
For the case of µ < µ^(0), the proof is exactly the same as that for the
case of µ < µ^(0) in Proposition 5.
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Table1: Results of the Field Experiment by List and Lucking-Reiley (2002)  
A. Experimental Design
Number of solicitations mailed 500 500 500
Seed money (%) 10% 33% 67%
Seed money ($) $300 $1,000 $2,000
B. Result
Number of contributions 17 33 42
Participation rate 3.40% 6.60% 8.40%
Total contributions $202 $805 $1,485
Mean amount given $11.88 $24.39 $35.36
Standard error of mean amount $2.27 $2.50 $2.26
Source: Table 1 of List and Lucking-Reiley (2002)  
Table 2: the Results of Example 1
θ proportion of donors total donation mean amount ofdonation success/failure
5 0.538988 6.66530 12.3663 s
0 0.343800 3.67958 10.7027 f
-5 0.183498 1.73830 9.47316 f
-10 0.080441 0.68844 8.55843 f
Table 3: the Results of Example 2
θ l k * proportion ofdonors total donation
mean amount
of donation success /failure
2 0 4.02115 0.419913 4.74859 11.30851 f
1 2.02115 0.499156 4.98773 9.99233 f
2 0.02115 0.578432 5.06894 8.76324 s
3 0 0.57926 5.06895 8.75073 s
0 0 4.02115 0.343800 3.67958 10.7027 f
1 2.02115 0.419913 3.90876 9.30850 f
2 0.02115 0.499156 3.98941 7.99231 f
3 0 0.500000 3.98942 7.97884 s
Figure 1: The relationship between vi, p(vi), and θˆ(vi)
Figure 2: Illustration for the proof of Remark 3
